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Abstract 
In 1856, the Treaty of Paris nominally welcomed the Ottoman Empire 
into the Concert of Europe, but this exposed a deep fault line in 
international relations. Although the gesture implied full sovereign 
rights, it seemed incompatible with the extraterritorial privileges held by 
Europeans in Ottoman lands under the age-old capitulations. New 
commercial treaties complicated the issue by extending similar 
privileges to British subjects as far afield as China, Siam and Japan. 
Consular jurisdiction soon became the focus of controversy in 
Westminster as extraterritoriality featured prominently in local disputes 
following British commercial expansion across Asia, among them the 
Arrow incident that led to the Second Opium War. In Japan and other 
states, it would also become a key grievance in popular campaigns 
against ‘unequal treaties’ and the injustices of informal empire. This 
analysis shows how, even before such narratives of resistance emerged, 
there was already a seam of ambivalence  in Victorian political discourse 
on the question of extraterritoriality. In the Foreign Office it came as no 
surprise to be told of defects in these treaties, but it was the context of 
the existing debate, notably fresh initiatives to set up mixed courts, that 
framed the British response. 
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As the Crimean War drew to a close, the strategic imperative for Britain, 
France and Austria was to ensure a solid bulwark against Russian ambitions 
in the Mediterranean. In March 1856, this desire for a strong ally led to Article 
VII in the Treaty of Paris, as the Ottoman Empire was ‘admitted to participate 
in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe.’1 It was 
an unprecedented step to accept a non-Christian state into this select club, but 
one that exposed a deep fault line in nineteenth-century international 
relations. Since membership implied full sovereign powers, it appeared to be 
inconsistent with the extraterritorial rights still held by Europeans within 
(and compromising the sovereignty of) the Ottoman Empire. Conscious of 
this ambiguity, a sweeping caveat promised a multilateral conference on 
extraterritoriality, to be held in Constantinople.2 The conference never took 
place, and further treaties in the 1870s after fresh military conflict with Russia 
would only entrench the existing arrangements, perpetuating the ‘hanging 
sovereignty’ or ‘sovereignty in abeyance’ that characterized the last decades 
of Ottoman rule.3 
In a global order centred on a parochial ‘inner circle’ of ‘civilized 
states’, admission to the Concert of Europe was thus a pyrrhic victory.4 As 
membership spread across the Atlantic, moreover, the system outgrew its 
regional origins and a more inclusive framework, the Comity of Nations, 
came into usage.5 European by design, the Westphalian model of sovereignty 
was considered universal in scope.6 Already full recognition had been 
accorded to the new Latin American republics.7 However unstable or corrupt 
such regimes might be, the consensus was that they shared with Europe a 
common understanding of international law. Even the island kingdom of 
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Hawai‘i was accorded full sovereign rights in 1846 on concluding treaties 
with Britain and France. Having converted to Christianity in 1820, this 
became the first non-European indigenous state admitted to the Family of 
Nations.8 
No such understanding was shared with non-Christian states to the 
east. In the Ottoman Empire, customs, religion and laws were considered so 
fundamentally different that special concessions known as capitulations had 
long since exempted Venetian, Genoese and other merchants from local 
justice. These granted foreign residents the privilege of extraterritoriality by 
placing them under the protection of their own consuls.9 Initially conferred as 
gifts of all-powerful sultans (notably Suleiman the Great to the king of France 
in 1536), such privileges were now viewed more as inherent rights.10 
Montesquieu, among others, had fostered a belief that Europeans were 
entitled to immunity from the barbarous laws that oriental despots used to 
enslave their own subjects. Fears of alleged tyranny and torture justified 
similar privileges as Western powers then made terms with China (1842), 
Siam (1855), and Japan (1858).11 
Extraterritoriality thus became a key element in the treaty port system 
extended across East Asia in the nineteenth century. The 1843 Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act provided a legal framework, confirming the authority of 
British courts overseas ‘by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and 
other lawful means’.12 Soon after the Treaty of Paris, however, concerns were 
raised in some quarters about the wisdom or even justice of consular 
jurisdiction. In October 1856, it was at the heart of the Arrow incident, the 
dispute in Guangzhou that prompted the outbreak of the Second Opium War. 
Apprehension would only grow as, two years later, the resulting Treaty of 
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Tianjin established yet more foreign settlements in China, and similar terms 
in the Treaty of Yedo brought British consuls to Japan.13 This analysis charts 
the emergence of awareness on a contested issue in Victorian political 
discourse. It identifies a seam of ambivalence on the question of 
extraterritoriality already manifest in Britain, even before it became a target of 
popular protest abroad. In the short term, as the unfolding debate reveals, 
these dissenting voices elicited only a limited government response, confined 
to enforcing regulations over British subjects, and experimenting with mixed 
courts. Ultimately, however, they would reach a wider audience, not only in 
the field of international law, but offering insight to states such as Japan in 
formulating their own arguments against consular regimes.  
 
I. Early Symptoms of a Victorian Complaint 
In international relations, extraterritoriality now features in debates on 
transnational flows and how globalization might be undermining the 
Westphalian state.15 The growing currency of the term has also prompted 
renewed interest in the study of its past.16 In legal circles, however, it never 
really went away. The 1943 US-China Treaty may have abolished 
extraterritorial rights, for example, but a supplementary agreement soon 
created the framework for ‘a blanket of exemption from local law’ that was 
subsequently implemented for US servicemen in military bases across the 
globe.17 In the notable case of Okinawa, the US-Japan Status of Forces 
Agreement remains a source of political tension today. Elsewhere, the term 
has featured in questions ranging from the growth of cyberspace and policing 
multinational corporations to protecting refugees, rendition and terms of 
detention in Guantanamo Bay.18    
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In modern histories of the Middle East and East Asia, the theme of 
resistance to extraterritoriality features prominently in narratives of struggle 
against Western domination. Already by the mid-nineteenth century, one 
Ottoman statesman had identified some pernicious effects. At the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1856, Grand Vizier Ali Pasha complained that extraterritoriality 
‘constitutes a multiplicity of Governments within the Government, and 
consequently, an insuperable obstacle to all improvements’.19 Such awareness 
was yet to crystallize in East Asia, but in the 1870s it became a key grievance 
in the campaign for treaty revision launched in Meiji Japan. It was also a 
central element in the appeal against ‘Unequal Treaties’ made by the Chinese 
Republic to the League of Nations in 1925. By this stage, extraterritoriality had 
been phased out in Japan, as the 1894 Aoki-Kimberley Treaty came into force 
in 1899, and then in Turkey with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Persia followed 
suit in 1928, and Thailand in 1938, but it was not removed from China until 
1943. To some extent the practice continued in the Mixed Courts of Egypt 
until 1949, and in the International Zone at Tangier until 1956.20 Even then, the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by the British Crown over non-Muslim 
foreigners remained throughout the Persian Gulf (except in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia); in Kuwait it only disappeared in 1961, in Muscat in 1967, and 
elsewhere in the region by 1971.21 
Resistance to these extraterritorial regimes did not appear overnight. 
Practical issues in the daily running of consular jurisdiction were always 
apparent, but without some grounding in international law the theoretical 
implications were less clear. Only in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, moreover, did the ‘positive’ turn in this field introduce a notion of 
sovereignty incompatible with capitulations and other traditional forms of 
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legal pluralism. As late as the 1790s, for example, Edmund Burke defended 
the overlapping systems of jurisdiction in India during the impeachment of 
Warren Hastings.22 A less accommodating view would emerge, however, for 
as American jurist Henry Wheaton declared in 1836, ‘the exclusive power of 
civil and criminal legislation is…an essential right of every independent 
state.’23 In this framework, extraterritoriality could only exist by ‘express 
compact’, as an exception to the general rule.24   
Long before the issue became a focus of popular indignation, therefore, 
educated elites from Constantinople to Edo struggled to digest these alien 
concepts in their own cultural terms.25 Initially, their exposure to the Law of 
Nations came through diplomatic correspondence, but subsequently they also 
had access to legal texts in translation. In the Ottoman Empire the gestation of 
these Western ideas began in the Tanzîmât (Reorganization) period of legal 
reforms introduced in 1839, a year after new commercial treaties were signed 
with Britain and France. In East Asia it accompanied American missionary 
William A. P. Martin’s translation of Wheaton’s Elements of International Law 
into Chinese in 1864, and the return from Europe of the first Japanese 
travellers to study the Law of Nations abroad.26 
Facing no such language or cultural barriers, some British observers 
were already expressing reservations over consular jurisdiction. Commenting 
on the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, for example, the foreign secretary, Lord 
Aberdeen, pointed out, ‘the commercial privileges and personal immunities 
which are secured by the treaty to the subjects of Russia appear to be at 
variance with any notion we are able to form of the authority of a sovereign 
and independent prince.’ His prime concern was Russian encroachment, but 
he betrayed the cultural superiority of his age when explaining how this 
	   7	  
anomalous situation was ‘in consequence of the defective administration of 
justice by the Turkish Government’.27 Twenty-five years later in 1854, just as 
Aberdeen’s own coalition government was launching the Crimean campaign, 
the despatch containing these remarks was laid before Parliament and 
circulated by the press.28 According to the Times correspondent in 
Constantinople, the system of capitulations was now ‘a great subject for 
reform’, as foreign powers exercised jurisdiction ‘in a manner inconsistent 
with national independence and sovereign rights’.29 While ‘it is true that the 
Turkish courts are execrable’, he admitted, it was still deplorable that, ‘in 
every district of the empire, in every class of society, the influence for evil of 
capitulations and legalized foreign interference is to be observed.’30 
By this stage, British diplomats were increasingly suspicious of Russian 
and French motives for granting protection to Orthodox and Catholic subjects 
in Ottoman lands. At the same time they were creating such protégés of their 
own, many of them from the Ionian Islands or Malta, both British 
protectorates since 1815, ‘to say nothing of genuine Greeks and Armenians 
who managed to get English passports under one pretence or another’.31 As 
Eustace Grenville-Murray, a maverick diplomat writing under the name of 
‘The Roving Englishman’ complained in 1855, ‘it is a notorious fact that 
passports according the privileges of British subjects are much too lightly 
given to foreigners – especially in the Levant.’32 The Law Officers of the Crown 
also voiced concern that in ‘the Turkish dominions, China, Morocco, Siam, 
and Japan’, the recent Orders in Council issued under the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act had ‘invested H. M.’s Consuls and Vice Consuls in these countries with 
very extensive and peculiar powers; exceeding in many instances the 
jurisdiction of power possessed by any British court or magistrate, or by the 
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Governor of any British colony’.33 Across the Middle East, moreover, language 
problems had even induced the Foreign Office to appoint local merchants to 
British consular posts. In the words of Edmund Hornby, then a young official 
in Constantinople, ‘the whole Levant service had got out of hand.’34   
Gathering in 1856, European diplomats at the Congress of Paris agreed 
that there were issues with extraterritoriality. As Ali Pasha pointed out, it 
even contributed to the trading obstacles that they themselves now wished to 
regulate.35 Intent on containing Russia, they recommended modifications, but 
these would be subject to Ottoman legal reforms, and in practice fell short of 
removing extraterritorial rights. The British also responded by commissioning 
Hornby to submit a report on the judicial powers exercised by consuls with 
no legal background. In 1857 this led, by Order in Council, to the creation of 
the British Supreme Court in Constantinople, a new second-instance tribunal 
with trained judges.36 Further negotiations would also produce a new land 
code by 1867, at last granting foreigners the right to own property in the 
Ottoman Empire. The problems raised in Paris had not disappeared, but it 
seemed they were being addressed. In British political circles, meanwhile, 
attention on the subject shifted to East Asia, where consular jurisdiction 
appeared to be instrumental in fomenting ‘Queen Victoria’s Little Wars’.37 
Rather than just part of the Eastern Question, or confined to either China or 
Japan, it permeated a broader debate on British foreign policy as a whole. 
  
II. Extraterritoriality in Victorian political thought 
Early in 1856, just as the talks in Paris were settling the Crimean War, 
news emerged that Lord Dalhousie, the governor general of India, had 
proclaimed the annexation of Oudh. Back in London, the growing workload 
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facing the Foreign Office was soon compounded by the Sepoy Rebellion 
(1857-58), the opening of treaty ports in Japan (1859), and the extension of 
trade down the Yangzi Basin after the Second Opium War (1856-60). At this 
high watermark of free trade imperialism, there was general confidence in the 
benevolent, even civilizing, influence of Victorian commerce across the globe. 
Some dissenting voices, however, were less sure of where this burden of 
responsibility might lead. Humanitarian concern was expressed for the 
welfare of colonial subjects, and calls for non-intervention reflected a growing 
sense of anxiety on the overextension of empire.38 
Richard Cobden and other advocates of free trade were among the 
fiercest critics of far-flung military campaigns. While not entirely against 
imperial expansion, the Cobdenite, or Manchester School, saw commerce, not 
war, as the path to lasting prosperity. Recent incidents involving consuls in 
East Asia also concentrated minds on the question of extraterritoriality. 
Consulting texts on international law, politicians used a familiar but effective 
rhetorical device, drawing hypothetical comparisons to highlight European 
double standards towards non-Christian states. Such a line of enquiry could 
lead to reflections on the nature of ‘civilization’ itself. 
In February 1857, for example, Cobden’s attack on the outbreak of the 
Second Opium War in the House of Commons helped bring down Lord 
Palmerston’s government (albeit temporarily).39 He condemned the handling 
of the Arrow incident as ‘illegal on our part’. In his view, Harry Parkes, the 
British consul in Guangzhou, had no right to complain, let alone resort to 
force, after local police boarded a Chinese vessel and arrested her Chinese 
crew on suspicion of piracy. He also cast doubt on his claim of injured 
national pride, as allegations that they had hauled down a British ensign in 
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the process were never confirmed. It was patently a flag of convenience 
anyway, obtained when the ship’s Chinese owner registered the Arrow in 
Hong Kong, and the licence, moreover, had since expired.41 Had this occurred 
in Charleston, stressed Cobden, the British ambassador in Washington would 
make his officials on the spot apologize to the governor of South Carolina, 
rather than demand redress as had happened to Commissioner Yeh in 
Guangzhou. He was also unimpressed by calls from Liverpool merchants to 
limit duties on imports and exports in China to 5 per cent, remarking, ‘that is 
certainly a tariff which I should like to see applied to Liverpool.’ And as for 
their demands to open all Chinese coastal river ports to British vessels, he 
wondered how they might react if the Tsar announced similar designs on 
Turkey. ‘Can you imagine anything more stunning than the explosion which 
would take place at Liverpool’, he asked, ‘if such a ukase as that were to come 
to us from Russia?42  
When the Treaty of Tianjin brought a halt to the military campaign in 
1858, this too came under fire in the House of Lords. British privileges were 
now extended across China, but with all his experience as a former colonial 
secretary and early advocate of free trade, Henry Grey expressed doubts 
about the prospects for peaceful relations. Even in the existing treaty ports, he 
observed, consuls were hard pressed ‘to watch over and carefully scrutinize 
the conduct of all persons being British subjects trading under their 
superintendence’. Merchants who chose to make profits in China should do 
so at their own risk, he argued, for ‘if they were only to be judged by English 
laws, when there were no English police, no English courts, and no means of 
maintaining order and peace, it was utterly impossible that abuses should not 
prevail.’43    
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Although in a minority, Grey was not alone in voicing concerns over 
British expansion in Asia. John Stuart Mill, himself a former employee of the 
East India Company, held reservations about the incoming Raj.44 Similarly, the 
prolific writer, Francis William Newman, blamed the unrest behind the Sepoy 
Rebellion on Dalhousie’s controversial ‘doctrine of lapse’, which had been 
used to seize territory in ‘any just opportunity’. Writing in the Westminster 
Review, he insisted that Britain in 1858 still had a duty to uphold its 
‘international’ relations with recently annexed Indian states, and condemned 
Dalhousie’s methods as symptomatic of British foreign policy as a whole. ‘The 
word just, thus used by English statesmen towards Asiatics’, Newman 
explained, ‘means in accordance with treaty, quite regardless of the questions 
whether that treaty was obtained by unjustifiable violence, (as were all our 
treaties with Oude,) and whether the party who made the treaty had any legal 
or moral right to make it.’45  
The new treaties of Tianjin and Yedo, for example, both declared that 
‘justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides’.46 In the 
case of China this was clearly imposed by war, but the treaty with Japan 
seemed peaceable enough. Yet in The Capital of the Tycoon, a two-volume 
memoir published in 1863, Sir Rutherford Alcock, the British minister in 
Japan, proclaimed that Townsend Harris, his American counterpart, had 
secured the momentous treaty by threatening British force.47 During an 
interview in Edo Castle in 1857, Harris had certainly exaggerated the import 
of letters he received from Sir John Bowring, the governor of Hong Kong, 
when he warned that ‘the English government…is ready to make war with 
Japan.’48 Either way, Grey went on to tell the House of Lords that all these 
treaties ‘were obtained by coercion’.49 
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Grey soon became the most vocal critic of ‘the clause which is known 
by the barbarous name (I do not know who invented it) of the extra-
territoriality clause’.50 In portraying a state of near anarchy in the treaty ports, 
his outlook revealed a streak of establishment prejudice against mercantile 
communities abroad. This view from Westminster also reflected the bias 
shown by British diplomats towards foreign merchants in Japan.51 
Paraphrasing Alcock, Grey declared, ‘in scarcely any other country in the 
world can there be found so large a number of reckless and lawless 
individuals.’52 Similarly, during a visit in 1860, the bishop of Victoria, George 
Smith, found Yokohama infested with ‘disorderly elements of Californian 
adventurers, Portuguese desperadoes, runaway sailors, piratical outlaws and 
the moral refuse of European nations.’53 Unfortunately, the consuls in charge 
of this unruly host did not boast much legal training, and in both China and 
Japan at this stage any capital cases or appeals were referred to the Supreme 
Court of Hong Kong. As Grey put it, ‘if France had a right to say that French 
subjects should not be punished for offences committed in England save by 
the French authorities, when France had no tribunal here, you would not, I 
maintain, preserve London from plunder for twenty-four hours.’54  
Even without disgruntled samurai lurking nearby, confusion over 
extraterritorial privileges caused tensions within the Yokohama foreign 
community. Merchants did not take kindly to being called ‘the scum of 
Europe’, and no British diplomat was allowed inside the Yokohama Club 
until Alcock had left Japan.55 A turning point was the case of Michael Moss, a 
young trader who, in November 1860, contrived to shoot and seriously 
wound a Japanese guard while resisting arrest for breaking local laws against 
hunting game and using firearms within twenty-five miles of Edo Castle. As 
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La Patrie observed at the time, ‘foreigners attempting to shoot in Windsor 
forest, or the French forests, would at once find themselves within the grasp 
of the law.’56 Held in a local gaol for several hours before the British consul 
secured his release, Moss was ordered to pay a fine by the consular court and 
then deported. The Yokohama community organized a collection to raise this 
sum, however, and an attempt by Alcock to impose a further custodial 
sentence of three months in prison was overturned by the Hong Kong 
Supreme Court. Stung by the intimidation he faced from British merchants 
defending Moss, Alcock called for practical reforms. Trained judges should be 
appointed, he suggested, perhaps at Hong Kong, to be despatched on 
demand to any treaty port so that ‘the British communities would be liberated 
from the bondage to “boy consuls” and “lay justice”.’57 Referring to the 
Supreme Court at Constantinople, he added, ‘this, or a somewhat similar 
system, has been adopted with success in the Levant.’58  
By 1863, the increasingly volatile situation in Japan was threatening to 
embroil the armed forces in combat there as well. Grey’s comments to the 
Lords followed the news that a Royal Navy squadron was on its way to seek 
redress from the Satsuma domain for the murder of a British merchant the 
previous year. Charles Lennox Richardson had been out riding near 
Yokohama on 2 September 1862, when he was cut down by the vanguard of a 
daimyō procession. Whether or not the victim’s conduct provoked the fatal 
attack, in Grey’s eyes the incident was symptomatic of a foreign community 
out of control.59 It certainly reinforced the impression created by Smith in his 
recent account: ‘I have seen Englishmen and others of my acquaintance in 
different parts of Japan riding at a rapid pace through the villages and 
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suburbs of cities amid crowds of people, who had to scamper in hurried 
movement from side to side to avoid being knocked down.’60  
When reports on the bombardment of Kagoshima then emerged, the 
debate in Westminster shifted to the naval operation. Cobden declared, ‘it is 
precisely as though an enemy should lay Bristol in ashes because an 
individual had been murdered on the highway between London and 
Brentford.’61 Citing legists such as Vattel and de Martens, Charles Buxton 
reminded the House of Commons that ‘the destruction of towns was a 
measure odious and detestable,’ pointing out rules of conduct that ‘besiegers 
are to direct their artillery against the fortifications only.’62 To some extent his 
audience was already aware of the logistical difficulties involved, following 
the bombardment of Tringanu, a comparable incident in southern Siam in 
November 1862. On that occasion, they were told, ‘Captain Corbett did his 
best to fire only upon the palace and the fort, but, owing to the rolling of the 
ship, some of the shells fell into the populous town and set it on fire.’63 
In Japan, meanwhile, reprisals loomed again in 1864, this time after 
batteries of the Chōshū domain guarding the Strait of Shimonoseki opened 
fire on foreign shipping, closing trade through the Inland Sea. Alcock himself 
came under the spotlight in Westminster for his belligerence in orchestrating 
the allied squadron that went on to silence the Chōshū guns that year. An 
anonymous pamphlet on Diplomacy in Japan was laid before Parliament, 
suggesting that it was the consuls rather than merchants who deserved 
reproach, notably Alcock for setting a bad example.64 The treaty itself was 
most to blame, however, since extraterritoriality was ‘a suicidal concession by 
the nation which permits it’.65 It only caused trouble for those who claimed the 
privilege, and ‘in reply to the abuse generally heaped upon the mercantile 
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community, as the authors of all the troubles in Japan, they may, in self-
defence, point to the instance of Canton [Guangzhou], among others, where 
trade had been carried on for upwards of one hundred years in quietness and 
with prosperity, so long as Extraterritoriality clauses were not in existence.’66 
This gave a rosy portrayal of the Canton System, which had frequently been 
the source of Sino-British tensions from its inception in the mid-eighteenth 
century until the First Opium War.67 It implied, moreover, that the 
destabilizing effect of extraterritoriality served an insidious agenda, by 
claiming that ‘within twenty years of the commencement of the present 
system, three wars have been undertaken to gain a position of ascendancy for 
“Western civilisation”.’68 
This was Grey’s cue to tell the Lords: ‘it is desirable that the treaty 
should be revised and its terms amended.’ Outlining twelve resolutions for 
Japan, he proposed, ‘it is in the first place indispensable greatly to restrict the 
operation of what is called the “extraterritoriality” clause.’ He was shocked, 
for example, that the British consul in Yokohama should have to issue a notice 
condemning ‘the reckless manner in which Englishmen were in the habit of 
riding at full speed through the crowded ways’. At present the authorities 
also seemed powerless ‘to enforce the good conduct of our own subjects’, for 
as Grey observed, ‘if English sailors at Havre or New York, or American and 
French sailors in Liverpool, were exempt from the interference of the local 
police, and if they could only be dealt with by their own Consuls, it would be 
impossible for a single day to maintain order and peace in these towns.’ If 
extraterritoriality must be retained at all, he suggested, ‘it ought to be 
confined within the narrowest limits possible.’70    
	   16	  
Grey’s motion was defeated, but soon afterwards the full text of his 
resolutions appeared in the Yokohama Commercial News and was promptly 
translated into Japanese. 71 In London as well they reappeared in a collection of 
essays published in 1865 under the title of The East and the West: Our Dealings 
with Our Neighbours. Grey’s thoughts had clearly struck a chord with its editor, 
Henry E. J. Stanley, reminding him of his own experience as a diplomat in 
Ottoman lands. Charting the evolution of foreign privileges from their origins 
in the capitulations, his leading piece on ‘Our Consular System’ stressed that 
the current arrangements had become open to abuse. In Constantinople, for 
example, a British steamer ignored local protests when landing near the 
palace and ‘blew all its smoke through the windows’. In Bangkok as well, 
local customs are flouted as ‘Europeans delight in standing on the small 
wooden bridges over the canals when any of the Ministers or great nobles are 
passing in front of it by water.’72  
Appalled at ‘the damage done by the extra-territorial system’, Stanley 
argued that ‘Lord Grey’s Resolutions were called impracticable, [only] 
because they were too practical, and at once cut at the root of the evil.’73 The 
introduction of consular jurisdiction to Japan had been a grave mistake and 
‘its inefficacy to maintain order had been proved by experience.’ He then gave 
ten reasons why ‘it is illusory to hope for any satisfactory administration of 
justice from the Consuls arising in cases between their subjects and the 
inhabitants of the country.’ Indeed, he contended, ‘these treaties could hardly 
work effectively, even with the best machinery.’ Given that French and British 
subjects managed to cope without such protection in South America, it 
seemed only reasonable that the number of consuls should at least be 
reduced, ‘until the obsolete capitulations are done away with in Turkey, and 
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the treaties with other countries altered, so as not to be, as at present, sources 
of war and impunity for crime’.74   
The case made by Stanley was so openly hostile to consular jurisdiction 
that it marked, as Jennifer Pitts notes, ‘a provocative moment in the Victorian 
debate over the scope of international law’.75 He was certainly an unusual 
character, having converted to Islam in 1859 during his travels in the Middle 
East, and would go on to become Britain’s first Muslim peer. Other essays in 
The East and the West discuss ‘Islam as a Political System’ and ‘The Greek and 
the Russian Churches’. His disdain for compatriots abroad also shone 
through when he declared, ‘no impartial Englishman, who has travelled and 
mingled largely with Foreigners, will deny, that as a nation we are extremely 
unpopular throughout the world.’ His strongest indictment appeared in ‘The 
Effects of Contempt for International Law’, where he declared that ‘in the 
nineteenth century “Civilisation” has taken the place of “Christianity” as a 
watchword, and pretext for aggression.’ Exposing the ‘fanciful divisions of 
civilised and uncivilised’, he held up to ridicule the language often used to 
justify extraterritorial rights.76   
These themes resurfaced in International Policy, an ambitious early 
critique of empire published in 1866 by radical thinker Richard Congreve, 
founder of the Positivist movement in Britain.77 In his view, relations between 
the East and West depended on curbing ‘the freebooting tendencies of 
European commerce’ by means of ‘vigorous surveillance’. To that end, he 
argued, it would help if the government withdrew ‘all protection from the 
unfair trader’ and left him ‘to the justice of those on whom at present he 
preys’.78 Other essays addressed England’s relations with ‘France’, ‘The Sea’, 
‘India’, ‘China’, ‘Japan’, and ‘The Uncivilised Communities’. Referencing 
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Alcock and the blue books presented to Parliament, the chapter on Japan 
criticized a treaty obtained by coercion, and ‘the reckless adventurers who at 
present swarm in Yokohama and Shanghae’. The conclusions were hardly 
radical, however, merely urging restraint on merchants and diplomats, so that 
‘the Japanese may in course of time forget their animosity to foreigners.’79   
A decade on from the Treaty of Paris, there were at least some signs 
that the political debate was having an effect. Yet rather than follow the calls 
by Grey and Stanley to pare down overseas commitments, this usually 
involved recourse to the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, extending regulations over 
British subjects abroad. By Order in Council in 1865, for example, a new 
appellate tribunal, the British Supreme Court for China and Japan, was set up 
in Shanghai, again under (now Sir) Edmund Hornby as a circuit judge with 
all his experience from Constantinople.80 Its creation was a pragmatic response 
to an anticipated ‘failure of justice’ in Yokohama, where a merchant called 
Alfred Browning had been accused of murder. With the longstanding ban on 
overseas travel still in place under Tokugawa law, his case presented the 
‘impossibility of sending the Japanese witnesses’ to appear at the British 
Supreme Court in Hong Kong.81 In the Ottoman Empire, meanwhile, closer 
regulation of foreign subjects was helping to curb the number of passports 
held by protégés.82 For Britain the problem was also alleviated by the cession 
of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864. With the now finalized land code 
coming into force in 1867, and a new proposal for a system of mixed courts in 
Egypt, it all consolidated the impression that, even though the underlying 
issue of extraterritoriality had not really been addressed, the recent debate in 
Westminster on consuls and privileges was leading somewhere, and reform 
was underway.    
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III. Mixed Courts: the lesser evil?    
Over the course of centuries, the capitulations in the Middle East had 
created a labyrinth of overlapping jurisdictions notoriously open to abuse. As 
an apocryphal tale in The Times describes: 
 
We read in The Roving Englishman in Turkey an account of the bewildered 
Pasha whose duty it is to grant an audience to the members of the consular 
body in the capital of his Government, and before whom visitors in 
Austrian, French, Russian, and English uniforms make their appearance 
one after the other until, on a close inspection, the Pacha [sic] recognizes 
one and the same man under a variety of disguises.83 
 
This article, which appeared in 1868, goes on to cite a story from Stanley’s The 
East and the West: ‘At Damietta, for instance, there is a Levantine bent down 
under the weight of consular dignities; he represents at third hand fifteen or 
sixteen nations.’84 Here was one of the so-called trading consuls, men of 
varying integrity, who juggled careers in diplomacy and business to carve out 
careers as ‘professional’ borderlanders. While many hailed from the countries 
they served, they also included ‘legal chameleons’ with multiple identities, 
motivated to some degree by the exemption from tax and immunity from 
local laws that consular status conferred.85 
As in the treaty ports of East Asia, expatriate communities held a 
mixed reputation in the Middle East. Only the month before, Sir Austen 
Henry Layard, the former permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office, 
told the House of Commons how he had once ‘blushed for the honour of my 
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countrymen’ when called upon to support fraudulent claims for 
compensation during his days at the British Embassy in Constantinople. The 
foreign secretary, Lord Stanley – namesake but not the author of The East and 
the West – also deplored the ‘intolerable abuse’ of extending protection to 
protégés, ‘for instance, in those cases in which Natives of the Ionian Islands 
have claimed the privilege’.86 Writing for The Times, Antonio Gallenga 
explained, ‘the only people who profit by the system are the ruffians, 
assassins, and thieves who render the streets of Pera and Galata unsafe after 
dark.’87 
This debate arose from the new proposal for mixed courts in Egypt. In 
a land where seventeen different authorities administered seventeen different 
codes, ‘the perversions of consular Jurisdictions’ (as the US consul-general 
called them in 1837) had created a ‘state of judicial chaos’.88 During his days as 
chief judge in Constantinople, Hornby could only sympathize with the British 
consul in Egypt, who had ‘an extremely unruly lot of subjects to deal with, the 
riff-raff of Malta and of the Ionian Islands’.89 The problem was most acute in 
the port city of Alexandria where the foreign population had grown 
exponentially in recent decades, reaching over 40,000 in the 1870s.90  
The aim of Nubar Pasha, Egypt’s new minister of foreign affairs, was 
to persuade all seventeen powers to recognize a single mixed international 
tribunal for civil cases. This was a grander version of earlier schemes in 
Constantinople, where jointly administered assemblies had first appeared as 
early as 1820 in civil cases involving foreign merchants. Since 1840, mixed 
tribunals (tidjaret) had also been implemented for commercial cases between 
Turks and foreigners.91 In 1859, moreover, Sir Henry Bulwer, the British 
ambassador in Constantinople, had suggested a system of mixed courts with 
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a single code. Implicit in the plan was an agenda to link the extension of local 
judicial powers to the promise of Ottoman legal reform.92  
After the Treaty of Paris, an unsuccessful attempt had been made to 
introduce the Ottoman system of mixed commercial courts to Egypt as well. 
So now with construction of the Suez Canal underway, Nubar Pasha’s vision 
seemed timely. There was little enthusiasm for the idea in Paris, however, 
when he delivered his proposals in 1867, but in London he found the Foreign 
Office more receptive. As Layard reminded the House of Commons the 
following year, Lord Stanley readily admitted ‘the evils to which the present 
system of Consular jurisdiction in Egypt has given rise’.93 Stanley himself 
conceded that, ‘by degrees the authority of local tribunals had been usurped 
or set aside by the encroachments of an extra-territorial jurisdiction’.94 
Arguments for and against mixed courts appeared in The Times, some written 
by Nubar Pasha, while a letter by a Mr. Bell expressed the reservations of the 
British community in Egypt.95 In the event, support from the British 
government was instrumental in creating the International Commission that 
convened in Cairo to discuss the plan in 1869, and by the spring of 1872 a 
general agreement was in place. Despite some French resistance, the new 
Mixed Courts were inaugurated in 1875, and from the outset were ‘a 
success’.96   
The debate on extraterritoriality in 1868 exemplified Victorian 
politicians’ struggle to reconcile stated principles with the application of 
justice. Ever since the Treaty of Paris, Lord Stanley insisted, ‘all the Great 
Powers of Europe have concurred in the feeling that the exercise of this 
Consular jurisdiction was an anomaly which it was desirable to remove.’ He 
even conceded, ‘there is no doubt that jurisdiction extra territorial of that kind 
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is in itself an evil.’ At the same time, he cautioned against Layard’s suggestion 
of extending Nubar Pasha’s model of mixed courts to Turkey, being such ‘a 
very wide Empire’ containing ‘provinces in various stages of civilization’.97 
Instead, he saw the Egyptian plan as an experiment that, if successful, could 
be applied elsewhere, a reading that would frame British policy for years to 
come. For all his rhetoric, therefore, Stanley struck a pragmatic note in 
defence of consular jurisdiction, warning that ‘it is a lesser evil’ to keep a 
flawed but tried and tested system than to introduce a high-principled but 
unproven court ‘which does not practically give justice’. This guarded 
response so incensed Gallenga that he told readers of The Times, ‘even the 
most mitigated Mussulman justice must appear the lesser evil.’98 It was also as 
a ‘lesser evil’ that a junior diplomat called Fukuchi Gen’ichirō, who travelled 
the world with the Iwakura Embassy in the early 1870s, would recommend 
adapting the Egyptian model of mixed courts for use in Meiji Japan.99 
Gallenga’s outlook on international law has been described as 
‘strikingly more inclusive’ than those of leading scholars in the field at the 
time.100 He was clearly unimpressed by what he saw as Stanley’s double 
standards: ‘the mere fact that we choose to consider other people as barbarous 
or semi-barbarous’, he insisted, ‘does not entitle us to act as barbarians 
towards them.’ Echoing Victorian anxiety over the trail of wars then 
following British trade across Asia, ‘it was Christian bigotry or hypocrisy’, he 
argued, ‘that indisposed against us distant nations, and reared up against our 
trade those “walls” which had afterwards to be overthrown by violence.’ 
Already Gallenga was adamant that ‘there must be one jurisdiction in Turkey 
and Egypt, as there is one in France or England.’102   
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Five years later in 1873, a conference of sorts was held in 
Constantinople to regulate the existing mixed commercial tribunals and, 
coinciding with the new system in Egypt, some modifications were 
inaugurated in 1875. These were practical amendments, however, so hardly 
amounted to the conference on extraterritoriality once promised in the Treaty 
of Paris.103 In effect, they only entrenched the prevailing assumption that until 
some ‘standard of civilization’ was reached or a ‘deficit of civilization’ 
bridged, capitulations would remain.104  In 1873, for example, the eminent 
international lawyer Friedrich Martens defended consular jurisdiction as a 
necessary instrument for enhancing the rule of law in ‘the East’. 
Extraterritoriality, he maintained, should be construed in terms of a civilizing 
mission, more as a duty than a privilege.105 Consular courts, properly run by 
competent judges, were thus an exemplar for local tribunals. The foreign 
secretary, Lord Granville, spoke in similar terms when he hosted leading 
members of the Iwakura Embassy on their visit to London in 1872. Following 
the benchmark laid down by Lord Stanley, he explained that ‘in all such cases 
the policy of the British Government was to yield [to] the local authorities 
jurisdiction over British subjects in precise proportion to their advancement in 
enlightenment and civilization.’106 This tenuous notion of measuring progress 
with scientific exactitude, however, would only ever amount to ‘conjectural 
policy’. Granville’s language promised fair treatment, but a ‘stable standard 
of civilization’ never emerged.107  
In East Asia as well, the British had shown some interest in mixed 
tribunals from an early stage. During the Second Opium War in 1856, Harry 
Parkes, the British consul in occupied Guangzhou, arranged for a local 
magistrate to attend in court. Dismissed as ‘little more than window dressing’ 
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by the Chinese, a memorial to the emperor described how this official ‘sits 
beneath the English and French judges, and although he is present, he is not 
allowed to talk, spit or smoke’.110 At the same time, British officials were 
perhaps aware of the questions raised on extraterritoriality in the recent 
Treaty of Paris, and plans for extending mixed commercial courts to Egypt. 
More than previous agreements in the region, the treaties that Lord Elgin 
signed at Tianjin and Yedo in 1858 show some effort to devise a collaborative 
style of dispute resolution, at least in civil cases.111  
Parkes experimented again in 1864 by working with local authorities to 
create the Shanghai Mixed Court, which presided over cases of Chinese 
defendants and those foreigners without consular protection of their own. 
Initially held in the British Consulate, this coexisted with the British Supreme 
Court set up by Hornby the following year.112 At one point there was even talk 
of amalgamation, but despite a sympathetic reaction from Alcock, now the 
British minister in China, Hornby was unmoved.113 In 1867 the court relocated 
instead to a new building in the Nanjing Road. There, as the International 
Mixed Tribunal, it became a visible symbol of Chinese authority, projecting 
Qing sovereignty in the extraterritorial enclave of Shanghai. In practice, 
however, this only invited foreign intervention in local justice, without 
eroding consular jurisdiction. There were some attempts to curb the 
interference of foreign assessors, such as new regulations in 1869, and the 
Chefoo Convention in 1876, which tried to prevent them from passing 
judgment on Chinese defendants. Nevertheless, the tribunal was always a 
source of conflict, and even closed temporarily in 1885 after an assault on the 
British assessor by the local subprefect. It remained in operation until 1926, 
before finally being replaced by a court under sole Chinese control.114 
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In Japan, a joint approach to civil cases was suggested in the Treaty of 
Yedo but never resulted in formalized mixed courts.115 Examples of 
cooperation did occur, such as the 1865 Edelman-Shibaya case, the trial of a 
Japanese defendant held in the British Consulate with representatives present 
from both sides.116 Japanese officials thus attended consular courts, consuls 
attended local tribunals, and mediation was often used to settle disputes out 
of court.117 In 1866, however, the British diplomat Ernest Satow complained in 
the Japan Times that difficult cases were often referred to the Customs House, 
‘a place where justice to the foreigner is utterly unknown’.118 So critical were 
foreign residents of Japanese bankruptcy law that the British consul in 
Yokohama took up his call for a mixed court and proposed a joint tribunal the 
following year.119 Satow’s articles were also translated into Japanese, and the 
subject resurfaced when the new Meiji government declared its intention to 
revise the treaties. Aware of British support for the idea, mixed courts then 
featured in the proposals for a draft treaty commissioned by Japan’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. It was also among the topics circulated by the British 
legation in Tokyo to consuls and firms in the treaty ports. As one response 
put it, ‘the system of a mixed court, which has worked as well in China might 
we think be adapted with advantage in Japan.’120 During his meeting in 
London with Iwakura Tomomi in 1872, Granville also ‘referred to the case of 
Egypt where the extra-territorial jurisdiction had formerly prevailed, but 
where the experiment was being tried of allowing Egyptian tribunals to 
administer the law in civil cases.’121  
The Japanese never showed any interest in the International Mixed 
Tribunal in Shanghai, but they took a close look at mixed courts in Turkey 
and Egypt. It was shortly after Iwakura’s interview with Granville that 
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Fukuchi Gen’ichirō was sent to investigate.123 He and his travelling 
companion, a Buddhist priest called Shimaji Mokurai, were the first visitors 
from Japan ever to reach Constantinople. Following their trip, Fukuchi 
presented a report advocating mixed courts along the Egyptian model, and 
further reports pursued the idea, despite some reservations expressed on key 
differences between Egypt and Japan.124 In the 1880s, it also featured in Inoue 
Kaoru’s strategy to rein in the problem of extraterritoriality when, as foreign 
minister, he hosted two multilateral conferences on treaty revision in Tokyo. 
The scheme was only abandoned in 1887, after a damning report by French 
legal expert Gustave Boissonade. Faced with public unrest at the prospect of 
foreign judges in Japanese courts, the hard-won agreement that Inoue had at 
last struck with the treaty powers rapidly collapsed. 
In Europe, meanwhile, the debate on consular jurisdiction and mixed 
courts shifted away from the corridors of power in Westminster and was 
increasingly confined to legal circles. Two organizations that featured 
prominently, both founded in Belgium in 1873, were the Institut du Droit 
International, and the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law 
of Nations (subsequently renamed the International Law Association). A 
commission set up by the Institute in 1874 conducted a survey on whether 
‘Eastern nations’ could be admitted to ‘the general community of 
international law’. Five years later, the English jurist Sir Travers Twiss 
reported to the fifth conference in Brussels that these states indeed shared 
with Europeans a common awareness of treaty obligations, but the moment 
had not yet arrived when they could dispense with consular jurisdiction.125 As 
if to reinforce the point, a new foreign tribunal, the British Court for Japan, 
was established in Tokyo in the same year. A similar note was struck in a 
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discussion on extraterritoriality in 1878 at the Association’s conference in 
Frankfurt. This occasion was also the first time that delegates from China and 
Japan attended such a gathering of international lawyers.126 While Guo 
Songtao, the Chinese minister to Britain, appeared resigned to the current 
arrangements, Ueno Kagenori, his Japanese counterpart, sought clarification 
on the perceived rules of entry to the Comity of Nations, ‘pressing for an 
opinion from the jurists of the west as to the touching point between the 
system of civilization and that of Orientalism’.127 In a year when the Treaty of 
Berlin settled the Russo-Turkish War, however, the prospects for overhauling 
the capitulations seemed more remote than ever. At this juncture, those states 
encumbered with extraterritorial regimes remained paradoxically consigned 
to ‘a permanent state of exception’, apparently beyond the pale of 
international society, in a realm ‘where “normal” rules did not apply’.128 
 
Conclusions  
Whenever the people of the Gobi Desert complained, the Consul just 
laughed and said, ‘it is in the treaty’. And when they suggested striking out 
the clause on consular jurisdiction, he ‘laughed so much that we hoped he 
would be suffocated’. As the Consul explained, ‘poor foolish people, revision 
gives no rights to you, it only gives rights to us.’129 This allegorical tale 
appeared in ‘Justice Abroad’, an article in The Fortnightly Review in 1874. The 
author, a long-term English resident in France called Frederick Marshall, was 
now secretary to the Japanese legation in Paris, and enlisted in the service of 
the Meiji government’s new campaign for treaty revision. In a scathing 
indictment of British foreign policy, he appealed to public opinion, ‘a force 
more powerful than gunboats’.130 It was hardly coincidence that his description 
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of extraterritoriality – ‘that barbarous word’ – echoed Grey’s address to the 
House of Lords a decade before.131  
The Victorian public, however, no longer seemed unduly concerned by 
British foreign policy in Japan, certainly less so than in previous years when 
controversy reigned over impending conflict and the despatch of troops to 
Yokohama. Once again the Eastern Question was a more pressing issue, as 
another war loomed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Reports of 
Bulgarian Christians massacred by Ottoman troops also prompted William 
Gladstone to condemn the ‘intolerable vices’ of the Turks.132 The principled 
statements on capitulations made in Paris twenty years before, now seemed 
like a vision from the distant past. Extraterritoriality may have become a 
burning issue in Japan, but in Britain the question was only viewed within the 
parameters of a familiar debate. Regulations were being extended, new 
tribunals introduced, and the whole discussion had since moved on to 
implementing mixed courts anyway.   
This compromise solution, however, was a double-edged sword; in 
practice the mixed courts sanctioned further encroachments on sovereign 
powers as much as they helped curb any excesses of consular jurisdiction. 
They also created an impression of reform in train, and even benevolent 
assistance, without confronting the underlying fault line of extraterritoriality 
once exposed in the Treaty of Paris.  
The issue had receded in Victorian politics, and debate on justice 
abroad was increasingly confined to the esoteric circles of conferences on 
international law. Public awareness of this topic was also now gravitating 
elsewhere. The following decade, punctuated by some sharp exchanges 
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between Japanese newspapers and the local English language press, the 
conference that never was in Constantinople ultimately convened in Tokyo.      
In most cases, the subsequent campaigns against extraterritoriality 
would continue well into the twentieth century, so they naturally form a 
theme of resistance often associated with later generations. Yet as this analysis 
shows, there was a significant level of political unease over the issue in mid-
Victorian Britain. Already some critics were keenly aware of the 
contradictions implicit in an international order that selectively withheld full 
recognition from a particular group of new member states. In the short term 
this controversy had a limited influence on policy, focusing attention on 
extending regulations for British subjects abroad, and fostering experiments 
with mixed courts. It was thus deflected and largely absorbed within an 
engrained official culture, invariably at cross-purposes with fresh attempts to 
revisit the judicial arrangements in the treaties. Content to paper over the 
cracks in the existing system, the Foreign Office seemed less inclined to 
engage with its structural flaws. Nevertheless, this political discourse not only 
stimulated debate in the realm of international law, but informed the outlook 
of states affected by consular jurisdiction themselves. In effect, it prefigured a 
growing realization that the foundations of extraterritorial regimes were not 
quite as sound as their proponents often supposed. 
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